GHSA-pfvc-3p5h-x7h6

Wings exposes node configuration secrets through egg configuration-file templating

### Impact **Type:** Exposure of sensitive information / insufficiently protected credentials leading to privilege escalation and full node compromise. Wings exposes its **entire** daemon configuration to the egg configuration-file templating engine. When Wings renders a server's configuration files, any `{{config.<path>}}` placeholder in a replacement value is resolved against the full marshalled daemon configuration, with no restriction on which paths may be read. Because the Panel substitutes **user-controlled** egg variable values into these replacements before sending them to Wings, a low-privileged user can smuggle a `{{config.*}}` placeholder through a variable value. The placeholder is then resolved by Wings and written into a file inside the user's own server, where it can be read via the file manager or SFTP. This allows reading, among other values: - `{{config.token}}` - the node's daemon token, which is both the API bearer for   the Panel⇆Wings channel **and** the HMAC signing key for every JWT the node   issues; - `{{config.token_id}}`; - `{{config.docker.registries}}` - configured container-registry credentials. **Who is impacted:** Any deployment where a user who is not fully trusted can set an egg variable value (e.g. a server owner or a subuser with the `startup.update` permission) **and** the server's egg renders a user-editable variable into a configuration file via `{{server.build.env.*}}`. This pattern is common across stock and community eggs, so most multi-tenant / shared-hosting deployments are affected. **Resulting impact:** Disclosure of the node daemon token lets the attacker forge authentication tokens and act against **every server on that node**, a full-node compromise reachable from a low-privileged account. ### Patches Yes. Fixed in **Wings `v1.12.3`** (Panel is unaffected; the fix is Wings-only). Wings no longer exposes its full configuration to the templating engine only an explicit, non-secret subset (the Docker network interface) can be resolved by `{{config.*}}` placeholders. Users should upgrade Wings to `v1.12.3` or later. **After upgrading, rotate the affected nodes' daemon tokens**, since a previously exfiltrated token remains valid until rotated (Admin → Nodes → Configuration → reset the token, then re-deploy `config.yml` to the node). ### Workarounds For operators who cannot upgrade immediately: - Audit your eggs and ensure no **user-editable** variable is rendered into a   configuration file, or mark such variables non-editable. These reduce exposure but are not a complete fix; upgrading Wings is the recommended action.