Gogs Vulnerable to Privilege Escalation via Collaboration Access Mode Validation
## Summary A repository admin collaborator can escalate their privileges to owner-level access by exploiting an off-by-one error in the `ChangeCollaborationAccessMode` function. ## Vulnerable Code In `internal/database/repo_collaboration.go`, line 129: ```go func (r *Repository) ChangeCollaborationAccessMode(userID int64, mode AccessMode) error { // Discard invalid input if mode <= AccessModeNone || mode > AccessModeOwner { return nil } ``` `AccessModeOwner` has value 4. The check `mode > AccessModeOwner` evaluates to `4 > 4 = false`, allowing `AccessModeOwner` to pass through. The correct check should be `mode >= AccessModeOwner`. The web route at `internal/route/repo/setting.go:413-416` takes the mode as a raw integer from query parameters: ```go func ChangeCollaborationAccessMode(c *context.Context) { if err := c.Repo.Repository.ChangeCollaborationAccessMode( c.QueryInt64("uid"), database.AccessMode(c.QueryInt("mode"))); err != nil { ``` This allows an admin collaborator to POST `mode=4` and escalate to owner. ## Impact A repository admin collaborator (AccessModeAdmin = 3) can escalate to owner-level access (AccessModeOwner = 4), gaining the ability to: - **Delete the repository** - **Transfer repository ownership** to another user - **Erase wiki data** - Perform all other owner-only operations The `access` table is also updated (line 181), so the escalated permissions persist across sessions. ## Contrast The API route at `internal/route/api/v1/repo_collaborators.go:46` uses `ParseAccessMode()` which only returns Read, Write, or Admin - never Owner. The API endpoint is not affected. ## Steps to Reproduce 1. User A creates a private repository 2. User A adds User B as a collaborator with **Admin** access (mode=3) 3. User B logs in and navigates to the repository settings collaboration page 4. User B sends a POST request: ``` POST /{owner}/{repo}/settings/collaboration/access_mode?uid={B_uid}&mode=4 ``` 5. User B now has **Owner** access - the "Danger Zone" section appears with "Delete This Repository" and "Transfer Ownership" buttons ## Suggested Fix Change the validation in `internal/database/repo_collaboration.go` line 129 from: ```go if mode <= AccessModeNone || mode > AccessModeOwner { ``` to: ```go if mode <= AccessModeNone || mode >= AccessModeOwner { ```
describes (1)
Related CVEs.
| ID | severity | exploitable | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-52804US | — | — | ||
Gogs is an open source self-hosted Git service. Prior to 0.14.3, a repository admin collaborator can escalate their privileges to owner-level access by exploiting an off-by-one err… | ||||
references
External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.
- https://github.com/gogs/gogsPACKAGE
- https://github.com/gogs/gogs/commit/1fdc9cc28e159135cfa4d6b11ecd5daa0f8ce22bWEB
- https://github.com/gogs/gogs/pull/8227WEB
- https://github.com/gogs/gogs/releases/tag/v0.14.3WEB
- https://github.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/GHSA-4565-r4x7-hg8jWEB
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-52804ADVISORY
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