Claude Code: Trust Dialog Bypass via Git Worktree Spoofing Allows Arbitrary Code Execution
Claude Code used the git worktree `commondir` file when determining folder trust but did not validate its contents. By crafting a repository with a `commondir` file pointing to a path the victim had previously trusted, an attacker could bypass the trust dialog and immediately execute malicious hooks defined in `.claude/settings.json`. Exploiting this required the victim to clone a malicious repository and run Claude Code within it, and for the attacker to know or guess a path the victim had already trusted. Users on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix already. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version. Claude Code thanks [hackerone.com/masato_anzai](https://hackerone.com/masato_anzai) for reporting this issue.
describes (1)
Related CVEs.
| ID | severity | exploitable | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-40068US | high8.8 | — | ||
In versions 2.1.63 through 2.1.83 of Claude Code, the folder trust determination logic used the git worktree commondir file without validating its contents. An attacker could craft… | ||||
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