uutils coreutils has a Link Following Issue
A vulnerability in the tail utility of uutils coreutils allows for the exfiltration of sensitive file contents when using the --follow=name option. Unlike GNU tail, the uutils implementation continues to monitor a path after it has been replaced by a symbolic link, subsequently outputting the contents of the link's target. In environments where a privileged user (e.g., root) monitors a log directory, a local attacker with write access to that directory can replace a log file with a symlink to a sensitive system file (such as /etc/shadow), causing tail to disclose the contents of the sensitive file.
describes (1)
Related CVEs.
| ID | severity | exploitable | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-35345US | — | — | ||
A vulnerability in the tail utility of uutils coreutils allows for the exfiltration of sensitive file contents when using the --follow=name option. Unlike GNU tail, the uutils impl… | ||||
references
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