chmod: --preserve-root bypassed by any path that resolves to root (e.g. /../)
`Chmoder::chmod()` only compares the literal argument against `Path::new("/")`, so the `--preserve-root` guard is bypassed by any path that *resolves* to root — a symlink to `/` or simply `/../`. ``` if self.recursive && self.preserve_root && file == Path::new("/") { return Err(ChmodError::PreserveRoot("/".to_string()).into()); } ``` **PoC** — recursively chmods the entire filesystem to `000` despite `--preserve-root`: ``` chmod -R --preserve-root 000 /../ -v ``` **Impact:** `--preserve-root` is the documented safeguard against destructive recursive operations on `/`. Bypassing it allows `chmod -R` to alter permissions across the whole filesystem, causing a complete system breakdown. Recommendation: canonicalize the target path before comparing against root. **Remediation:** Acknowledged by Canonical; fixed in commit 413055b3. --- _Reported by Zellic in the *uutils coreutils Program Security Assessment* (prepared for Canonical, Jan 20 2026), audited commit `3a07ffc5a9bd4c283e75afa548ba1f1957bad242`. Finding 3.1. Credit: Zellic._
describes (1)
Related CVEs.
| ID | severity | exploitable | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-35338US | — | — | ||
A vulnerability in the chmod utility of uutils coreutils allows users to bypass the --preserve-root safety mechanism. The implementation only validates if the target path is litera… | ||||
references
External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.
- https://github.com/uutils/coreutilsPACKAGE
- https://github.com/uutils/coreutils/commit/413055b378fa6fe2299c5e5f538c8e6e841ab810WEB
- https://github.com/uutils/coreutils/pull/10033WEB
- https://github.com/uutils/coreutils/releases/tag/0.6.0WEB
- https://github.com/uutils/coreutils/security/advisories/GHSA-4c7q-4928-8445WEB
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35338ADVISORY
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