OpenBao lacks user confirmation for OIDC direct callback mode
### Impact OpenBao does not prompt for user confirmation when logging in via JWT/OIDC and a role with `callback_mode` set to `direct`. This allows an attacker to start an authentication request and perform "remote phishing" by having the victim visit the URL and automatically log-in to the session of the attacker. Despite being based on the authorization code flow, the `direct` mode calls back directly to the API and allows an attacker to poll for an OpenBao token until it is issued. ### Patches Version 2.5.2 includes an additional confirmation screen for `direct` type logins that requires manual user interaction in order to finish the authentication. ### Workarounds This issue can be worked around either by removing any roles with `callback_mode=direct` or enforcing confirmation for every session on the token issuer side for the Client ID used by OpenBao.
describes (1)
Related CVEs.
| ID | severity | exploitable | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-33757US | high8.3 | — | ||
OpenBao is an open source identity-based secrets management system. Prior to version 2.5.2, OpenBao does not prompt for user confirmation when logging in via JWT/OIDC and a role wi… | ||||
references
External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8628#section-5.4WEB
- https://github.com/openbao/openbaoPACKAGE
- https://github.com/openbao/openbao/commit/e32103951925723e9787e33886ab6b6ec20f4964WEB
- https://github.com/openbao/openbao/security/advisories/GHSA-7q7g-x6vg-xpc3WEB
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33757ADVISORY
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