`unpack_in` can chmod arbitrary directories by following symlinks
In versions 0.4.44 and below of tar-rs, when unpacking a tar archive, the tar crate's `unpack_dir` function uses [`fs::metadata()`][fs-metadata] to check whether a path that already exists is a directory. Because `fs::metadata()` follows symbolic links, a crafted tarball containing a symlink entry followed by a directory entry with the same name causes the crate to treat the symlink target as a valid existing directory — and subsequently apply chmod to it. This allows an attacker to modify the permissions of arbitrary directories outside the extraction root. This issue has been fixed in version 0.4.45. [fs-metadata]: https://doc.rust-lang.org/std/fs/fn.metadata.html
describes (1)
Related CVEs.
| ID | severity | exploitable | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-33056US | medium6.5 | — | ||
tar-rs is a tar archive reading/writing library for Rust. In versions 0.4.44 and below, when unpacking a tar archive, the tar crate's unpack_dir function uses fs::metadata() to che… | ||||
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