GHSA-fhvm-j76f-qmjv

OpenClaw has a potential access-group authorization bypass if channel type lookup fails

## Summary When Telegram webhook mode is enabled without a configured webhook secret, OpenClaw may accept unauthenticated HTTP POST requests at the Telegram webhook endpoint and trust attacker-controlled update JSON. This can allow forged Telegram updates that spoof `message.from.id` / `chat.id`, potentially bypassing sender allowlists and executing privileged bot commands. ## Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Affected: `<= 2026.1.30` - Patched: `>= 2026.2.1` ## Impact An attacker who can reach the webhook endpoint can forge Telegram updates and impersonate allowlisted/paired senders by spoofing fields in the webhook payload (for example `message.from.id`). Impact depends on enabled commands/tools and the deployment’s network exposure. ## Mitigations / Workarounds - Configure a strong `channels.telegram.webhookSecret` and ensure your reverse proxy forwards the `X-Telegram-Bot-Api-Secret-Token` header unchanged. ## Fix Commit(s) - ca92597e1f9593236ad86810b66633144b69314d (config validation: `webhookUrl` requires `webhookSecret`) Defense-in-depth / supporting fixes: - 5643a934799dc523ec2ef18c007e1aa2c386b670 (default webhook listener bind host to loopback) - 3cbcba10cf30c2ffb898f0d8c7dfb929f15f8930 (bound webhook request body size/time) - 633fe8b9c17f02fcc68ecdb5ec212a5ace932f09 (runtime guard: reject webhook startup when secret is missing/empty) ## Release Process Note `patched_versions` is set to the first fixed release (`2026.2.1`). Thanks @yueyueL for reporting.