OpenClaw: WebSocket shared-auth connections could self-declare elevated scopes
### Summary A logic flaw in the OpenClaw gateway WebSocket connect path allowed certain device-less shared-token or password-authenticated backend connections to keep client-declared scopes without server-side binding. A shared-authenticated client could present elevated scopes such as `operator.admin` even though those scopes were not tied to a device identity or an explicitly trusted Control UI path. ### Impact This crossed the intended authorization boundary and could let a shared-secret-authenticated backend client perform admin-only gateway operations. ### Affected versions `openclaw` `<= 2026.3.11` ### Patch Fixed in `openclaw` `2026.3.12`. The gateway now clears unbound scopes for non-Control-UI shared-auth connections, and regression tests cover the device-less shared-auth path.
describes (1)
Related CVEs.
| ID | severity | exploitable | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-22172US | —OT elevated | — | ||
OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.3.12 contain an authorization bypass vulnerability in the WebSocket connect path that allows shared-token or password-authenticated connections to s… | ||||
references
External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.
- https://github.com/openclaw/openclawPACKAGE
- https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/5e389d5e7c9233ec91026ab2fea299ebaf3249f6WEB
- https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/pull/44306WEB
- https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.3.12WEB
- https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-rqpp-rjj8-7wv8WEB
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