Claude Code vulnerable to arbitrary code execution caused by maliciously configured git email
At startup, Claude Code constructed a shell command that interpolated the value of `git config user.email` from the current workspace. If an attacker controlled the repository’s Git config (e.g., via a malicious `.git/config`) and set `user.email` to a crafted payload, the unescaped interpolation could trigger arbitrary command execution **before** the user accepted the workspace-trust dialog. The issue affects versions prior to `1.0.105`. The fix in `1.0.105` avoids executing commands built from untrusted configuration and properly validates/escapes inputs. * **Patches:** Update to `@anthropic-ai/claude-code` `1.0.105` or later. * **Workarounds:** Open only trusted workspaces and inspect repository `.git/config` before launch; avoid inheriting untrusted Git configuration values. > Thank you to the NVIDIA AI Red Team for reporting this issue!
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Related CVEs.
| ID | severity | exploitable | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2025-59041US | critical9.8 | — | ||
Claude Code is an agentic coding tool. At startup, Claude Code executed a command templated in with `git config user.email`. Prior to version 1.0.105, a maliciously configured user… | ||||
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