rpc.py vulnerable to Deserialization of Untrusted Data
rpc.py through 0.6.0 allows Remote Code Execution because an unpickle occurs when the "serializer: pickle" HTTP header is sent. In other words, although JSON (not Pickle) is the default data format, an unauthenticated client can cause the data to be processed with unpickle. [Per the maintainer](https://github.com/abersheeran/rpc.py/issues/22), rpc.py is not designed for an API that is open to the outside world, and external requests cannot reach rpc.py in real world use. A [fix](https://github.com/abersheeran/rpc.py/commit/491e7a841ed9a754796d6ab047a9fb16e23bf8bd) exists on the `master` branch. As a workaround, use the following code to turn off pickle in older versions: ``` del SERIALIZER_NAMES[PickleSerializer.name] del SERIALIZER_TYPES[PickleSerializer.content_type]
describes (1)
Related CVEs.
| ID | severity | exploitable | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2022-35411US | critical9.8 | Exploit | ||
rpc.py through 0.6.0 allows Remote Code Execution because an unpickle occurs when the "serializer: pickle" HTTP header is sent. In other words, although JSON (not Pickle) is the de… | ||||
references
External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.
- http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/167872/rpc.py-0.6.0-Remote-Code-Execution.htmlWEB
- https://github.com/abersheeran/rpc.pyPACKAGE
- https://github.com/abersheeran/rpc.py/commit/491e7a841ed9a754796d6ab047a9fb16e23bf8bdWEB
- https://github.com/abersheeran/rpc.py/issues/22WEB
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8rq8-f485-7v8xADVISORY
- https://github.com/ehtec/rpcpy-exploitWEB
- https://medium.com/%40elias.hohl/remote-code-execution-0-day-in-rpc-py-709c76690c30WEB
- https://medium.com/@elias.hohl/remote-code-execution-0-day-in-rpc-py-709c76690c30WEB
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