Request smuggling is possible when both chunked TE and content length specified
### Impact Request smuggling is possible when running behind a proxy that doesn't handle Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding properly or doesn't handle alone \n as a headers separator. ### Patches https://github.com/ktorio/ktor/pull/1547 ### Workarounds None except migrating to a better proxy. ### References https://portswigger.net/web-security/request-smuggling https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-9.5
01
describes (1)
Related CVEs.
| ID | severity | exploitable | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2020-5207US | high7.5 | — | ||
In Ktor before 1.3.0, request smuggling is possible when running behind a proxy that doesn't handle Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding properly or doesn't handle \n as a headers… | ||||
02
references
External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.
scry
Advisories like this name the exposed products attackers go after on your perimeter. See what is exposed on your perimeter with a free passive scan.
Free scan