Deserialization of Untrusted Data in Apache Batik
In Apache Batik 1.x before 1.10, when deserializing subclass of `AbstractDocument`, the class takes a string from the inputStream as the class name which then use it to call the no-arg constructor of the class. Fix was to check the class type before calling newInstance in deserialization.
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describes (1)
Related CVEs.
| ID | severity | exploitable | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2018-8013US | critical9.8 | — | ||
In Apache Batik 1.x before 1.10, when deserializing subclass of `AbstractDocument`, the class takes a string from the inputStream as the class name which then use it to call the no… | ||||
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references
External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.
- http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/security-advisory/cpujul2018-4258247.htmlWEB
- http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/security-advisory/cpuoct2018-4428296.htmlWEB
- http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/104252WEB
- http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1040995WEB
- https://github.com/apache/xmlgraphics-batik/commit/f91125b26a6ca2b7a1195f1842360bed03629839WEB
- https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/BATIK-1222WEB
- https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r9e90b4d1cf6ea87a79bb506541140dfbf4801f4463a7cee08126ee44%40%3Ccommits.xmlgraphics.apache.org%3EWEB
- https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r9e90b4d1cf6ea87a79bb506541140dfbf4801f4463a7cee08126ee44@%3Ccommits.xmlgraphics.apache.org%3EWEB
scry
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